Chapter Four

Chapter Four:
Method of Verification - Evidence

1

Many philosophers have thought that the personal God has disclosed Himself in Reason, and that therefore we can use reason to prove His existence. The first sort of proof we will examine is called the “ontological proof”, for it argues from the concept of being to the existence of God. [1] This proof was first made famous by St. Anselm of Canterbury (1003-1109).

One way of stating the argument is that it is logically necessary for a necessary Existent to exist. [2] However, the nature of this “necessary Existent” is not defined in this approach; indeed, it could merely be the universe itself, and therefore a trivial proof.

The second form of this argument is more acceptable. It runs as follows: (1) We can conceive of a being than which no greater can be conceived. (2) It is greater to exist in the mind and in reality than to exist merely in the mind. (3) Therefore, God must exist in reality. [3] There are problems with both premises. The first one is in conceiving of a “greatest being.” This seems to be done merely through extrapolation of various concepts until the quality of “perfection” is reached. Aside from the fact that different people prefer different “perfections”, we know that merely to name a concept is not necessarily to clearly and distinctly conceive of it. That is, to call something “infinite” is not necessarily to understand or comprehend infinity: it is not equal to having that concept clearly in the mind. [4]

The second objection deals with the second premise, and has been taken up by Kant. He says that adding the notion of “existence” to a concept doesn’t really add something to it; rather, existence is an “instance” of that quality. [5] However, I can see the difference between a concept in the mind alone, and its fulfillment in really. Perhaps, the conclusion should be worded: “Because we can conceive a greatest Being, then the concept of God must include his existence in reality, therefore we must conceive of him as existing. The real problem pointed out by Kant is that it is illegitimate to get from a mere concept to an empirical fact without observation and experience of that fact.

2

The second traditional proof of God’s existence is called the “cosmological proof”, developed by Aristotle, Anselm, Aquinas, and Leibniz, among others. This technique argues from the fact of existence to the ground, or necessary source, of that existence. [6] There are three forms of the cosmological argument.

Causal Contingency

The first is that (1) everything that exists must have a cause; (2) this causal series cannot be infinite; (3) therefore, there must be a first cause of everything that exists.

There are two objections possible to this approach. The first is that the very notion of cause and effect has been challenged by some (e.g. Hume [7], it is merely our interpretation of frequent conjunction. Kant [8], our phenomenal judgments are not applicable to the noumenon). However, our assumptive principle of induction demands that we organize our “frequent conjunction” of experience into cause and effect relationships. The second is more to the point: it is that there is no reason we can’t have an infinite series of causes. [9] The notion of no first term is a familiar one to mathematics (especially dealing with transfinites), and therefore shouldn’t scare us as something new.

A new empirical twist has been proposed utilizing the “second law of thermodynamics”: i.e. the flow of energy in a closed system tends toward less organized forms, or in short, the universe is running down to a point called “heat death.” If this is true, it is reasoned, then the universe must have a finite life-span, therefore a cause within finite time. This seems to make sense. However, various hypothetical alternatives remain open: any science fiction buff is familiar with “parallel worlds”, time-reversal, etc. The existence of a parallel world with an opposite entropy-flow would exactly balance out the observed portion that we are familiar with, giving us in reality a steady state. Or, perhaps (utilizing the notion that anti-matter operates in a temporally reversed continuum, that is, that it actually travels backwards in time) we could imagine a “trans-temporal” framework in which we see the flow forward and backward in time, with temporal beginning and end, but with no “trans-temporal” terminal points!

Admittedly, these alternatives are not based on observed facts, and are only hypothetical, but so is – at this point – the notion of a personal, infinite, source of all causes (a strange proposition, indeed). Neither one is yet demonstrated: they are both hypothetical constructs. And the point is that the argument for the existence of one (the God hypothesis) is not logically compelling. Neither is the other – but this merely leaves us at a stand-off with two possible, but unproven, views.

Preservative Cause

The second type of cosmological argument moves from effects to cause, but not in a temporal sense. It says that the continued existence of each entity must be accounted for; and there can be no infinite regress, because then there really is no accounting whatsoever, for there is no final term. [10] The difficulty with this position is that there is no reason demonstrated that there must be a cause of continued existence, i.e. that some preservative cause must keep everything from going out of existence. Indeed, it seems that there might be just the reverse: a principle of inertia which automatically tends to keep objects in existence, like objects in uniform motion.

Contingency

The third form states that (1) things exist; (2) they are contingent, i.e. depend on something other than themselves for their existence; (3) therefore there must be an ultimate being that is not contingent. [11] We certainly can’t object to the first premise! But the second is suspect. To use the term “contingent” seems to sneak in the notion of “necessary” by contrast, right at the start. Therefore, if one grants contingency, he is bound to admit necessity.

But the real problem is perhaps in the notion of absolute contingency vs. mutual dependence It has been asserted that, since each item in the universe is dependent on something else, therefore the “whole show” is dependent. One example by analogy is the case of an argument composed of faulty elements (it is therefore a faulty argument), or a barrel of rotten apples (it is a bunch of rotten apples). However, the analogy doesn’t clearly apply. Why can’t the analogy be a machine, for instance, composed of mutually dependent parts? Surely, this is a model taken for the universe which applies more closely than a logical syllogism. In this model, we can see the possibility of each item being contingent, yet contingent upon the “whole show”, such that when everything is working together and understood in that context, each item is truly and comprehensively explained in terms of the whole. [12]

We see, therefore, that the ontological and cosmological arguments are not logically compelling; there are arguments on both sides. We obviously need further input to decide whether the noumenon is personal ad has disclosed himself. Reason alone is insufficient without data.

3

Another possible mode of divine self-disclosure is that of “religious experience.” A more complete treatment of this will be done in a later paper called “Christian Experience.” However, we will say here that there are two types of experience possible – propositional (scriptures, ethical injunctions, etc.) and non-propositional (emotional, visionary, etc.). There are clearly two problems involved with this mode. The first is theoretical, in that this experience must be mediated by human, fallible, frail, and sinful agents. We are left to private interpretation of experiences, and must trust fallible media to accurately appropriate, understand, and convey what is intended by the noumenon. The second problem is practical, in that in fact a variety of people have claimed to possess this religious contact, and their reports appear to conflict. Some of the reports conflict to such a degree that they are mutually destructive, i.e. contradictory. Therefore, great confusion has resulted in judging their validity – each man for himself.

Instead, we see that the most effective way for the noumenon to disclose himself would be if he were, himself, the medium of communication, as well as that which is communicated (in this case, we suppose it would be true that “the medium is the message”!). Next, the best medium would be a concrete human person, capable of communicating the noumenon with our categories, supplying us with true, yet not exhaustive knowledge of reality. If it actually occurred, this would take place as an “invasion” of the Creator into his creation, as an element within it. This may or may not have occurred, but it is his best shot. This of course gives rise to the notion of the “miraculous”, which is this very invasion.

4

There are two concepts of miracle that must be distinguished: (1) an unusual event, inexplicable in the current state of knowledge, and (2) an event, the source of which is not the usual cause/effect chain, but instead is the transcendent noumenon. The occurrence of an unusual event, or its denial, must simply be determined by normal scientific-historical canons of investigation. To rule out the possibility a priori is not only poor scholarship, but is a reactionary force, resisting new knowledge of the world.

To give a ruling concerning the source of that experience is a different matter. A mistake has often been made in affirming the source of an unusual experience to be God solely on the basis of the lack of scientific explanation available at the time. This leaves the ground open to new interpretation whenever science makes a new advance; in fact, this has been the course taken by the opponents of the miraculous, saying in effect “Sure, we can’t explain some things yet, but eventually we will; and then there will be no more miracles to explain, for as our understanding grows, your miracle diminishes, and finally dwindles to nothing!”

The proper procedure is along a different line. We could only know the source of an unusual event by the testimony of a veracious, competent witness. That is, an honest witness, able to perceive the source, to understand the meaning of the event, and to accurately relay to us this information. The only such witness possible is one who can transcend the human limitations and actually be in touch with the noumenon himself. In fact, the only such totally reliable witness would be the noumenon himself in his self-disclosure! Therefore, we see already that the notion of miracle depends on the revelation of the personal God, and cannot be ruled out a priori until a determination is made on the question of this self-disclosure.

An objection to this is voiced by saying that the laws of nature themselves are so strict and uniform, that they rule out the possibility of a miracle occurring. Hume is the most famous proponent of this view:

A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, form the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagine. … There must, therefore, e a uniform experience against every miraculous event, otherwise the even would not merit that appellation. And as a uniform experience amounts to a proof, there is here a direct and full proof, from the nature of the fact, against the existence of any miracle, nor can such a proof be destroyed or the miracle rendered credible by an opposite proof which is superior. [13]

The fallacy of this position should be obvious. How do we know there is a uniform law of nature? Simply because we inductively believe there is a cause for every event (which, oddly enough, Hume himself seems to question!), and continue looking until that cause if found. Our inductive principle, while requiring a cause, does not tell us where the cause is to be found, whether in the creation, or grounded directly in the creator. This still needs to be determined.

The question, then, is not whether we can find examples of “a-causal events” within experience (e.g. the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle [14]), but rather – believing there is to be a cause for each event – how large is the system we’re studying? Does it include the transcendent noumenon or not? And that, of course, depends on our topic: has the noumenon disclosed himself? It is suicide to rule out that disclosure at the start (for then we are left with no metaphysical or ethical answers). Instead, we must suspend judgment until we know some facts. (The notion of “larger systems” is wonderfully portrayed b y C.S. Lewis, in his book Miracles. [15] )

5

Gerald Larue, in his interview, gives two definitions of “myth”: (1) a statement that is “made up”, i.e. not true, and (2) a literary analytical term describing stories whose elements contain references to a God or gods and their dealings with men. As he feels the second definition is to be the most appropriate, we will accept it. Then: how can we tell if there is a TRUE myth, that is a true account of a God dealing with men? This, of course can’t be ruled out by calling it a myth (for a myth can be true or false)!

Larue rules out the possibility, on the basis that all such concepts are archaic, and tied in with the notion of a three-story universe, etc. In refutation of this, we might just add that the notion has been dealt with in this paper without the use of “pre-scientific” notions, and that – in fact – the only way science could refute the notion of the “true” myth would be to show that every possible instance is untrue – that is, that every instance where a man testifies to his own essence as the “self-disclosure of the noumenon” is either a liar or a fool. And this means, simply, that these testimonies must be sorted out and examined before the concept of the true myth is ruled out.

The notion of myth is no more nor less archaic in itself than the notion of a personal God, and historically it would be very difficult to show that monotheism is an ancient view, and that monism is the more enlightened, modern view. Similarly, if this “modern view” were to be in fact shown, then we must be careful to distinguish a “true notion” from a mere “fad”, for – as C.S. Lewis again so aptly points out – anything which is not eternally true is “eternally out of date.” [16]

Paul Tillich has a similar view to this as Larue. He objects to the notion of myth because “It uses material from our ordinary experience. It puts the stories of the gods into the framework of time and space although it belongs to the nature of the ultimate to be beyond time and space.” [17] What he seems to be implying here is that our categories are not appropriate in explaining or speaking of the ultimate. What he fails to understand, in my view, is that all language about such a subject, not just the “archaic” language, is equally metaphorical (ref. to chapter one concerning the use of symbol in reason).

C.S. Lewis makes four important points concerning this: (1) thinking and imaging (having mental images) are two distinctly different things. (2) we can have accurate thoughts without accurate images; (3) we can have accurate thoughts even when inaccurate images are mistaken for accurate ones; (4) all speech about super-sensibles must be metaphorical in a high degree. [18] In applying metaphor to ultimate matters, he finds it impossible to utilize some sort of “ultimate language”, and – indeed – when this is attempted it leads to comical result:

When we point out that what the Christians mean is not to be identified with their mental pictures, some people say, “In that case, would it not be better to get rid of the mental pictures, and of the language which suggests them, altogether?” But this is impossible. The people who recommend it have not noticed that when they try to get rid of man-like, or as they are called, “anthropomorphic”, images they merely success in substituting images of some other kind. “I don’t believe in a personal God”, says one, “but I do believe in a great spiritual force.” What he has not noticed is that the word “force” has let in all sorts of images about winds and tides and electricity and gravitation. “I don’t believe in a personal God’, says another, “but I do believe we are all parts of one great Being which moves and works through us all” – not noticing that he has merely exchanged the image of a fatherly and royal-looking man for the image of some widely extended gas or fluid. A girl I knew was brought up by “higher thinking” parents to regard God as a perfect “substance”; in later life she realized that this had actually led her to think of Him as something like a vast tapioca pudding. (To make matters worse, she disliked tapioca.) [19]

Thomas Aquinas has a good description for that type of symbol involved in the ultimate matters. While a “univocal” symbol would necessitate exact correspondence, and an “equivocal” symbol would involve no correspondence, the use of an “analogical” symbol would have a partial correspondence, that is, it would be like its object in some ways, and unlike it in others. [20] We can see the application of this principle downwards in the animal kingdom: we can say that a dog is “like” a man analogically (he may be friendly, shy, fierce, etc.); and similarly, a man who is the self-disclosure of the noumenon would be “analogically” like the noumenon: a true expression, although not exhaustive.

6

If we mean to make an assertion about reality, about the world, that statement should be available to open scrutiny, i.e. there should be some series of events that could be counted either for or against the truth of the assertion. Otherwise it is meaningless. Some think that statements about God are in that category – that they are not verifiable or falsifiable. [21] If this is true, then statements about God are indeed meaningless; but if there really is a means by which we could open such statements to verification or falsification, then it is meaningful, and must be subjected to such tests.

In order to do this, we must first remember that the nature of symbolic knowledge is such that it is either deductive or inductive: that is, either pure form (tautological), or only probably statements of a logical framework involved in connecting experiences, possible experiences, and judgments according to a basically inductive technique. Deductive knowledge tells us nothing about the real world itself, only propositions. Inductive knowledge does indeed tell us something about the world, but its judgments are only probably, not absolutely certain, because they involve the matrix of experience/judgment within one’s life. Therefore, if the noumenon has disclosed himself, this knowledge must take the form of probably, inductive knowledge, based on the best evidence available, and open (like all knowledge) to public scrutiny and tests of verification that are appropriate.

How can we verify or falsify the proposition that “the personal, infinite noumenon has disclosed himself in a concrete person”? (1) We must first point to a concrete person, or persons, that have made the claim. (2) We must then apply the best available tests to determine if he is veracious and competent. If there is more than one, then we must apply the same tests impartially to determine the validity (or lack of it) of each.

The best test of personal testimony is the legal canon of evaluating evidence. This technique of course is used in life-and-death situations through-out the world, and must be considered to be acceptable to most humans in most places for a rigorous, sensible means for telling about the honesty and competence of witnesses. We are examining the testimony of the claimant, therefore legal evidential procedure appears to be the most acceptable test available.

Secondarily, since many persons capable of making the claim have obviously lived in the past: that is, are not contemporaneous with us, their claims would have to be preserved in historical documents. Therefore, as a subset of legal evidential procedures, we will accept the canon of historiography, i.e. the technique for handling and evaluating historical documents, to make a judgment on the documents themselves before we evaluate the claims within them.

7

Legal evidential procedures are basically aimed at determining two things: (1) is the witness able to tell the truth (competence), and (2) is the witness willing to tell the truth (veracity). J.M. Maguire, in his Evidence: Common Sense and Common Law, states this:

Cross examination tests what legal commentators are prone to term human testimonial qualities – (1) willingness, and (2) ability, to tell or otherwise convey the truth about the subject matter of inquiry. Willingness may perhaps best be talked about in terms of sincerity. Ability has to be broken into several fractions. One of these is understanding perception of the event or condition under investigation. A second is correctness and comprehensiveness of memory brought to bear at the time when belief is manifested. The third and last, usually to be taken for granted, is power of intelligible expression. [22]

The key is that the witness is to testify of his own knowledge, not just something that he picked up second-hand. Hearsay evidence, that is “testimony in court, or written evidence, of a statement made out of court, the statement being offered as an assertion to show the truth of matters asserted therein, and thus resting for its value upon the credibility of the out-of-court asserter”, [23] is not considered acceptable evidence unless it is merely referring to the truth that a certain statement was made (without judging that statement’s truth or falsity), and in this case it is not properly hearsay.

For example, for Peter to say that Paul stated certain things in his letter does not count in dealing with the truth of Paul’s assertions in his correspondence; however, it is perfectly admissible as evidence that Paul’s letters did indeed contain the mentioned assertions. This rule assumes that persons are “conversant with their own affairs”, [24] and can normally make intelligent judgments concerning their own experience.

“Expert testimony” is different from that of an eye-witness; the witness tells what he saw, and makes simple inferences about it; the expert is enlisted in order to make judgments that are not capable of being made by the jury: i.e. specialized knowledge and considerations. [25] Circumstantial evidence can be important in testimony for the corroboration or destruction of testimony. [26] Further, secondary evidence is sometimes permissible when it is the best evidence available. [27] Of course, the first-hand, immediate testimony of one or more competent witness is ideally the sort of evidence one looks for. The purpose of examining these witnesses is to determine the credibility of direct testimony, discover additional facts related to the matter, and uncover supplementary facts necessary for sound judgment. [28]

8

In addition to the competence of the witness, it is important to ensure his veracity, through a variety of tests designed to verify or refute the statements he brings forth. There are at least seven factors to consider.

There must develop an internal consistency of his statements. [29]

The question of bias must be considered; i.e. even if he is competent to make judgments of the evidence available to him first-hand, is he willing to tell an objective account of it, or will his evidence be swayed through bias? [30]

The demonstrated character of the witness is usually taken into account, to see if he has a record for veracity in general. [31]

Does the testimony agree with the material facts already ascertained, or does it contradict them? [32]

The witness must be able to express his perceptions clearly. [33]

Collateral circumstance must be taken into account. [34]

Has the witness contradicted out-of-court statements previously made? [35]

If all of these tests are applied, and the witness fulfills the various requirements, then we can be assured that he – being both competent and veracious – should be regarded as a faithful and accurate witness of that which he is asserting. If the tests show a weakness in either ability or willingness, then he must be rejected as a first-rate witness.

9

The “burden of evidence” is different from the “burden of persuasion.” The former shifts throughout the inquiry, while the latter is simply assigned at the end. [36] The burden of persuasion means that one party has the responsibility to produce a certain degree of evidence in order to make his point, and that if he fails to do so, the other party wins the argument by default. The allocation of this burden (also called in general the “burden of proof”) usually goes to:

the party seeking the affirmation of a fact or event, [37]

the party seeking the affirmation of an unusual event, [38]

the party possessing peculiar knowledge of the situation [39]

the party which accuses another of fraud [40]

For example, the burden of proof would fall, in varying degrees, to the party who claims that John Doe robbed the store; to the party who claims that Fred Smith is really a man from outer space; to the party claiming that Lenin is back from the dead (revealed only to themselves); to the party claiming that Jimmy Jones has committed fraud.

The type of evidence necessary to make a judgment varies with the nature of the case. There are three degrees of proof needed to make a decision: preponderance, reasonable doubt, and clear and convincing evidence.

Preponderance

“Preponderance” simply means that there is ore evidence for one than for the other; a fifty-percent mark must be passed, and then the party that has produced the better evidence wins. This is applicable in civil cases, ordinary litigation. Of course, it is not just the volume of paperwork, or simple quantification of the evidence, but rather the total cogency, which determines which party has made the best case. [41]

Reasonable Doubt

“Reasonable Doubt” is used in criminal cases, and charges of fraud. [42] This means that the accuser must have much more than mere preponderance, but must make his case so strongly that no “reasonable doubt” remains. This doesn’t mean “any doubt”, but “reasonable doubt.” This notion is of course common in the American law system, where the “innocent is presumed innocent until proven guilty.”

Clear and Convincing Evidence

There is a mediating position between preponderance and reasonable doubt; that is “Clear and Convincing Evidence.” This is to be used in certain important civil cases, wheel the evidence must be greater than the preponderance-51%, but doesn’t need to be as great as that in criminal charges. This has been stated by Dean McCormick:

They require that the trier must have an “actual belief” in, or be “convinced of” the truth of the fact by this “preponderance of evidence.” Does this mean that they must believe that it is certainly true? Hardly, since it is apparent that an investigation by fallible men based upon the testimony of other men, with all their defects of veracity, memory, and communication. Does it mean a kind of mystical “hunch” that the fact must be true? This would hardly be a rational requirement. What it would most naturally be understood to mean by the jury (in the unlikely event that it should carry analysis so far) is that it must be persuaded of the truth of the fact is not merely more probable than not, but highly probably. [43]

How are we to apply these three standards to our own quest? Where does the burden of proof lie? How strong must our proof be? There are many factors to consider. First, historical procedure ordinarily leads to an acceptance of preponderance of evidence, i.e. whatever interpretation of the facts at hand seems more likely to be true. [44] Second, the burden of preponderance is upon those pleading the affirmative of a fact, those pleading an unusual fact, and those possessing peculiar knowledge of the fact to be demonstrated. Therefore it seems as though the burden belongs to us in the degree of preponderance.

However, the nature of the assertion is so important (that the noumenon has disclosed himself in the world) that it would seem our burden would be that of reasonable doubt. However, this is almost countered by the fact that, if it is not true, and we find witnesses that have claimed it to be true, the result might indeed by a charge of fraud against the witnesses (because of the importance of the assertion). In this case, the burden would be on those who see to prove that fraud has indeed taken place, and this burden is reasonable doubt.

Therefore, we have three allocations involved:

Preponderance on the prover of fact

Reasonable doubt on the prover of the fact

Reasonable doubt on the prover against the fact.

It seems that a mediating position might be offered. And this is precisely the degree of “Clear and Convincing Evidence”, not as strong as reasonable doubt, but more sure than preponderance.

10

In case of the death of the witness(es), no cross-examination is possible; and therefore, no cross-examination as such is necessary. Instead of asking the witness questions, his testimony as incorporated in written material must take the place of oral testimony. [45] This is one exemption from the hearsay rule. [46] When evaluating ancient documents (thirty years old or more), the “best evidence” rule applies: “the best proof that the nature of the thing will afford is only required.” [47] The rule concerning ancient documents can be stated, saying that:

Every document, apparently ancient, coming from the proper repository or custody, and bearing on its face no evident marks of forgery, the law presumes to be genuine, and devolves on the opposing party the burden of proving it to be otherwise.” [48]

In these instances, we must use the canon of historiography in order to determine the validity of documents containing testimony, and then – once the integrity and authenticity of the documents is decided – we must use the legal standards mentioned about to evaluate the testimony contained within them. The “raw material” provided for us are sometimes called “traces” or “sources”, i.e. those objects left from the past, which can give us clues to what transpired in their day. [49] The types of traces are categorized as physical, written, and oral traces. [50] Usually, of course, written traces (documents) contain the more “information” due to its use of language; however, physical objects (statues, implements, etc.) tell their story in corroborating the documents; and oral testimony is sometimes valuable.

The integrity and authenticity is determined from an analysis of the materials themselves, and a comparison with already-known facts which tend to corroborate or refute the findings of internal analysis. Five things are analyzed in this process:

materials (paper, ink, implement used for writing, etc.)

form (style, handwriting)

content (internal claims, characteristics, reference to events, dates terminus + and –

possible reasons for forgery

when dealing with copies of the original autographs, textual criticism [51]

The external corroboration of these findings is also important. Independent (two or more), reliable witnesses is one things that is helpful. Also, the verification by appeal to common knowledge of historical or other germane facts. Circumstantial evidence also contributes to this corroboration. [52]

Now that we have the “traces”, and evaluated their internal evidence, and checked with the external evidence, we apply the two legal standards to judge whether the author was (a) willing, and (b) able, to give us accurate information: i.e. a reliable testimony. Historiography uses these standards, just as the judicial system does. First, we must deal as much as possible with primary (not secondary) documents; the nearness to the facts, and competence to judge the facts must be evaluated. [53] Direct is preferred to indirect testimony, first-hand preferred to hearsay, etc. [54] Second, we must take into account possible biases, the desire to please the receive of the document at the time, the writing for contemporaries for ulterior motives, motives of forgery, and writing to impress posterity. [55]

The means of interpreting these documents must be according to sound semantic and exegetical principles, [56] not willy-nilly, and subjective interpretations. Five guidelines of legal interpretation are helpful in this:

The meaning is to be sought in the document itself; it should be thought to be self-interpreting whenever possible. [57]

The clear intention should prevail over particular words when ambiguous.

The literal meaning should be accepted whenever possible.

Extrinsic evidence should be applied only when necessary, and when applied, its meaning should involve an understanding of the circumstantial connection between it and the document itself.

The document must be construed as a whole; exegesis must be in context. [58]

And so, we have found our canons of verification: the legal and historiographic principles used in evaluating testimony and documents containing that testimony. Now it remains to put these principles to use.